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Abstract
This paper uses Spanish Labor Force Survey data for the period 2005 to 2010 to
analyze the job search methods adopted by unemployed natives and immigrants. We
focus on the determinants of these job search methods and examine the interaction
between the methods selected and native and immigrant exit rates from unemployment
in a period that covers the transition from economic growth to crisis. Our findings
suggest that, irrespective of the job search methods adopted, the hazards of leaving
unemployment are greater for natives than they are for immigrants. The gap emerges
in the second half of 2006, one year before the onset of the international crisis. Prior to
this date, no differences were observed in their respective exit rates from unemployment.
Finally, we find a mixed correlation between the job search methods and the probability
of finding a job.
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1 Introduction
In most European countries, immigrants belong to the most vulnerable groups in the labor
market, performing worse than their native counterparts. According to Eurostat, the unem-
ployment rate in the European Union 15 (EU-15) in 2010 was 14.8% for immigrants (i.e.,
those born outside EU-15) and 8.8% for natives. The median annual net income for the
same two collectives in 2010 was 13,478 and 18,330 euros, respectively. Most of the academic
research on labor migration has focused on the effects of immigrants on native populations
and on the assimilation of immigrants. However, the strategies, in terms of the job search ac-
tivities, that underpin immigrant and native performances in the labor market have received
little attention in the empirical labor literature.1 The articles by Frijters et al. (2005) and
Daneshvary et al. (1992) are, however, two notable exceptions, while a number of papers have
examined job search activities in the general population or in other defined groups (see, for
example, Holzer (1988) for the US, Osberg (1993) for Canada, Addison and Portugal (2002)
for Portugal and Bachmann and Baumgarten (2013) for Europe).
Spain’s immigration has grown substantially over the last twelve years. Figure 1 shows
that its foreign-born population increased from 2.9% of the total population in 1998 (1.2
million) to 14.0% in 2010 (6.6 million) while the foreign-born working age population (WAP)
grew from 3.4% of the total WAP (0.9 million) to 17.4% (5.5 million) in the same period.
Additionally, since the onset of the global financial and economic crisis, Spain’s labor market
has been particularly hard hit. Thus, the unemployment rate has risen from 8.3% in 2007 to
20.1% in 2010, but this increase has been particularly high among the immigrant population,
where unemployment rate has risen from 12.2% in 2007 to 30.2% in 2010.
In this study, we have used data for Spain between 2005 and 2010 in order to analyze
the interaction between job search activities (job search methods used) and the performance
of natives and immigrants in the labor market (finding a job and type of job found). We
believe that Spain is a particularly appropriate testing ground for conducting this study for
the following reasons:
1The choice of job search methods and how much effort unemployed individuals devote to job search
activities are crucial in the efficiency of the matching process in the search and matching models (see Pissarides
(2000)).
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1. The country experienced a massive influx of immigrants in a very short period of time.
This inflow of immigrants was the largest among developed countries.2,3
2. The international crisis, which started in 2007, has had a severe impact on the Spanish
labor market. Above all, the rise in unemployment since 2007 (from 7.8% to 19.3%)
has been, by far, the highest among developed countries.4
3. Finally, the duality (permanent and fixed-term contracts) that characterizes the coun-
try’s labor market provides an interesting opportunity to analyze the interaction be-
tween job search methods used and their effectiveness in finding more “stable” employ-
ment.5
Thus, in this article, we document and provide empirical evidence of the job search
methods being adopted by unemployed natives and immigrants in the Spanish labor market,
and their relative success in finding a job, with a particular emphasis on the effects of the
change in the business cycle following the onset of the international economic crisis. More
specifically, based on a rotating panel data set, drawn from the Spanish Labor Force Survey
(SLFS, Encuesta de la Poblacio´n Activa) for the period 2005:1-2010:2, we analyze for both,
unemployed natives and immigrants, the determinants of their adoption of different job search
methods and the influences of the methods chosen on the probability of finding a job.
The novelty of the immigration phenomenon in Spain has generated, in recent years, a
growing number of studies analyzing the labor market assimilation of immigrants, as well
2Concretely, during the period 2000-2006, among developed countries, Spain was the second recipient of
immigrants in absolute terms (only behind the US) and had the highest level of all in relation to the native
population, with an annual average of 540 thousand immigrants (OECD (2007)).
3Spain’s immigration was predominantly labor immigration attracted by demand factors, like the economic
boom between 1995 and 2007 and the small size of native young cohorts. Unlike other Europeans countries,
the proportion of asylum seekers in the total inflow of immigrants was just 2.7% in Spain, compared to 79%
in Sweden, 58% in France, 46% in Denmark and 38% in the UK (Source: OECD Data-set-International
Migration Database).
4These figures are relatively high to those recorded by other European countries that are equally exposed
to the international crisis. For instance, between 2007 and 2010, the unemployment rate (for workers between
20 and 64 years old) in Greece, Ireland and Portugal rose from 8.3 to 12.7%, from 4.4 to 13.6% and from 8.2
to 11.1%, respectively.
5For more details on the duality of the Spanish labor market see, among others, Bentolila et al. (2012)
and Silva and Va´zquez-Grenno (2013).
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as, the economic effects of immigration flows on the labor market opportunities of native
populations.6 However, the use that natives and immigrants make of job search methods
remains unexplored in Spain. We hypothesize that if there are differences in their respective
behaviors, then, these differences could help us to explain the unequal labor market outcomes
shown by these two collectives of workers.
Our findings reveal a number of differences in the strategies used by unemployed natives
and immigrants during their job search process. However, no significant differences are
found across the immigrants’ regions of origin. We also document that controlling for search
methods used, observed and unobserved characteristics, immigrants are less likely to gain
employment than natives. In addition, and consistent with some previous empirical evidence
for Spain, we find that, regardless of the search method used, before the start of the crisis
(until the second half of 2006) there were no differences in the probabilities of natives and
immigrants finding employment (i.e., Gonza´lez and Ortega (2011)). In the same line as
Carrasco and Garc´ıa-Pe´rez (2012), we find that natives’ advantage appears five or six quarters
before the onset of the international crisis (second semester of 2006) and continues until the
6Carrasco et al. (2008) and Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2011) are two of the first studies that
examine the effects of the recent immigration wave on labor market outcomes in Spain.
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end of our period of analysis. Although with very low levels of statistical significance, we
also find that immigrants are at a disadvantage when it comes to getting permanent jobs.
The empirical evidence available to date on the subject of “search methods/immigration”
refers primarily to the US and the UK. In an early study, Daneshvary et al. (1992) analyzed
immigrant assimilation in terms of the job search methods adopted by immigrants as their
length of residence in the US increased. They report evidence of an assimilation pattern;
specifically, they observe that immigrants tend to use the same job search strategies as
those employed by natives within twelve years of their arrival in the US. Frijters et al.
(2005) provide empirical evidence of the job search methods used by immigrants and their
efficiency in obtaining jobs in the UK. Specifically, they find that male immigrants have
more trouble finding jobs than white UK born males and that the choice of search method
explains “virtually” none of the difference in job-finding probabilities between natives and
immigrants. A further branch of this literature explores job search activities by focusing on
the behavior of ethnic minorities. Battu, Seaman and Zenou (2011) and Pellizzari (2010) are
two examples of this approach conducted in the UK and the European Union, respectively.
They analyze whether unemployed individuals that belong to ethnic minorities are more
likely to use personal contacts than other “formal” search methods. They also compare the
relative efficiency of these unemployed workers in finding jobs. Their findings show that
personal networks are the most popular method among ethnic minorities and, ultimately,
immigrants have greater trouble than natives in finding work.
This paper has points in common with some previous assimilation studies conducted in
Spain, in the sense that we compare the search strategies of natives and immigrants, and
the subsequent labor market performances of these two collectives. Among others, Amuedo-
Dorantes and De la Rica (2011), Ferna´ndez and Ortega-Masague´ (2008), Silva and Va´zquez-
Grenno (2011) and Alcobendas et al. (2012) analyze, by looking at different labor outcomes,
the economic assimilation of immigrants in Spain. Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2011),
using the 2001 Population Census and the 2002 Earnings Structure Survey, find evidence of
the assimilation of immigrants in terms of employment and occupations, but this assimilation
process varies significantly by gender, educational attainment and their origin. Ferna´ndez
and Ortega-Masague´ (2008), using data from the Spanish Labor Force Survey, between 1996
and 2006, find that after five years of residence in Spain the initial gap in participation and
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unemployment rates tends to disappear. Silva and Va´zquez-Grenno (2011) document an
immigrant assimilation process, in terms of job-finding and job separation rates, for those
that have lived for more than four years in Spain. Alcobendas et al. (2012) study assimilation
patterns by skill level using the SLFS for the period 2000-2008. Contrary to findings from
countries with a longer tradition of immigration, they find that having a high-school degree
does not give immigrants an advantage in terms occupation or wage assimilation (relative
to their native counterparts). Finally, our analysis has points in common with Carrasco and
Garc´ıa-Pe´rez (2012), who study the labor market responses of natives and immigrants to
the economic crisis. Using administrative data drawn from the Spanish Social Security, they
find that immigrant workers are more sensitive than natives to the changes in the economic
conditions in 2008, both in terms of unemployment and employment hazards. Concretely,
during periods of economic growth immigrant unemployment exit rates are higher than native
rates and, in times of bad economic conditions the job separation rates are also higher for
immigrants.
This paper seeks to contribute to the literature by: i) documenting and providing empir-
ical evidence of the interaction between job search activities and the job finding probabilities
of natives and immigrants in an economy in transition from a boom to a recession that has
had severe effects on the labor market; ii) studying the differences in the job search meth-
ods/startegies adopted by these two groups. Then, our paper is closely related to Frijters
et al. (2005), in the sense that we also document and provide empirical evidence on the de-
terminants of the job search methods used by natives and immigrants, and their respective
efficiency in their transitions from unemployment to the employment status; and to Battu et
al. (2011), as we draw on similar data.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section two we introduce the
database and the characteristics of our sample. In the third section we present a descriptive
analysis, while in section four we outline our empirical methodology. The econometric results
are presented in section five and section six concludes.
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2 Data and sample characteristics
Our analysis draws on data from the SLFS which is conducted every quarter with a sample
of some 65,000 households (about 180,000 individuals). Since the second quarter of 1987, the
SLFS has operated as a rotating panel in which each household is surveyed for a maximum
of six consecutive quarters. Each quarter a new cohort of households is selected, and one
sixth of existing households leave the sample. The SLFS is designed to be representative
of the total Spanish population, and its main goal is to reveal the characteristics of that
population with regard to the labor market. Labor force transitions can be studied by
monitoring consecutive information for the same individuals. These data have been available
since 1987:2. Here, we consider twenty-two consecutive waves of the SLFS. The first wave
corresponds to that of the first quarter of 2005 while the last corresponds to that of the
second quarter of 2010.7 Specifically, we consider all individuals of working age (20 to 64)
that reported being unemployed8 for at least one period during their inclusion in the SLFS
sample and observed more than one period. We exclude those individuals who were receiving
any type of pension and those self-perceived as disabled. Further, we select individuals from
the following regions: Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Europe non EU-15.9 Natives comprise
the majority of the sample, 67,049 individuals (90.8%), observed on average for a total of
4.7 periods. The remaining 9.2% of the sample are individuals without Spanish or other
European Union 15 nationality (6,752), present on average for 4.0 periods.10,11,12
Our data concerning job search methods are derived from responses to the following
7We have had to restrict our period of analysis because the database (flow statistics in the SLFS) only
provides information by nationality since 2005.
8All individuals looking for job opportunities as an employee, in self-employment or both in the four weeks
prior to interview.
9We also exclude individuals from North America (except Mexico) and Oceania. Those originally from
these continents represented just 0.75% of the foreign-born population in 2010.
10We define immigrants by their nationality. The SLFS (flows database) does not provide information
about place of birth.
11If this difference in the average number of periods reflects the fact that immigrants are more likely than
Spaniards to change residence in order to take up a job (see Amuedo-Dorantes and De la Rica (2010)), then
we are underestimating the job finding rates.
12In the SLFS flows database attrition makes impossible to match all individual workers across quarters.
The unconditional non-responses vary from 7 to 17% in the first and sixth waves respectively (see Jime´nez-
Mart´ın and Peracchi (2002)).
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questions in the SLFS: Are you registered at the public employment office?; Are you registered
at a private employment office?; Have you contacted entrepreneurs?; Have you asked your
family, friends or unions about a job?; Have you posted or answered an advertisement?;
Have you taken an exam or an interview?; Have you looked into becoming self-employed?;
Have you looked for funding to become self-employed?; Are you awaiting the results of a job
application/s?; Are you preparing exams to become a civil servant?; Are you waiting for a call
from the public employment office?; Have you looked at job advertisements in newspapers, on
TV, radio, etc.? Following Battu et al. (2011), we then aggregated these job search methods
in six groups: public employment office, private employment office, news (answering adverts,
placing adverts and looking for media adverts), personal networks (family friends and unions),
direct (contact entrepreneurs, looked into permits required/financing available for becoming
self-employed) and others.
3 Descriptive analysis
Table 1 shows the percentage adoption of the distinct job search methods by the different
groups in our sample. The most common job search method among all unemployed workers
is that of personal networks (72.6%), followed by direct methods (62.3%) while the least
frequently employed method is, by some distance, the private agency (25.6%). The level
of education attained by the unemployed workers seems to have an influence on the choice
of job search method. Individuals with a university degree are more likely to use search
methods that include seeking opportunities in the media (news), looking for information to
set-up their own business (direct), registering at private agencies and other methods, while
they are less likely to register at a public employment office and turn to personal networks.
By contrast, unemployed individuals with lower levels of education make more use of public
job offices and personal networks than the rest of the unemployed. We observe an inverted
U-shaped pattern in the use of most methods with increasing duration of unemployment.
As the length of unemployment increases, the use of search methods also rises, but when an
unemployed worker becomes a long-term unemployed, we notice a fall-off in the use of job
search methods. One explanation for this behavior could be that the recently unemployed
find jobs more easily and so require less search effort, whereas, at the other extreme, the lower
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search effort recorded by the long-term unemployed could be a result of growing feelings of
discouragement.
A comparison of the methods used by natives and immigrants shows that the latter are
more likely to use personal networks in seeking a job (80.6% vs. 71.8%) and less likely to
be registered in the public employment office (60.9% vs. 48.0%). An examination of the
job search strategies adopted by immigrants from different regions of origin does not reveal
any marked differences. However, unemployed individuals from Africa tend to make greater
use of personal networks, direct and private agencies; those from Latin-American countries
prefer to use private agencies, news and direct methods. Those from the European non EU-15
countries use public employment offices, and private agencies, less than other immigrants.
Unemployed individuals with no previous experience use most of the search methods less
frequently than those with experience (except news). We also observe differences in job
search strategies by gender, age and years of residence. Men show a preferential use of direct
methods and personal networks; the young unemployed prefer news and direct search methods
and are less likely to use a public employment office; we also observe that immigrants with
more than three years of residence in Spain tend to increase their use of formal job search
methods (agencies, news and direct). Finally, the last column of the Table 1 reports the
average number of job search methods used by unemployed workers classified according to
their individual characteristics.
Table 2 presents, for natives and immigrants, the percentage of use made of each job search
method in each year and the average number of methods used by year for the whole period.
For both natives and immigrants, we observe a U-shaped pattern with a decline in the use of
all search methods until the end of the period of expansion (2007) with a trend break in 2008
coinciding with the start of the economic crisis in Spain. The same pattern is observed for
the average number of search methods used. In other words, a response of the unemployed
individuals is detected in terms of the use of the different job search methods to the sudden
and huge increase in unemployment from the beginning of 2008. This result probably reflects
both a change in the composition of unemployed individuals as well as a change in the
job search strategies of those unemployed for some time. In particular, the increment in
the use of the public employment office by immigrants (from 39.9% in 2005 to 59.2% in
2010) is surprising. This rise in the use of the public employment office by immigrants
9
Table 1: Use of different job search methods of unemployed workers
Percentage of unemployed workers Average
public private news personal direct other Number
agency agency networks Methods
All 59.73 25.56 50.21 72.57 62.29 55.89 4.63
Primary school 62.15 18.91 35.49 75.77 54.93 50.97 4.12
Secondary school 60.08 25.37 50.44 73.63 62.93 55.80 4.67
University degree 56.68 31.95 62.75 67.09 67.24 60.51 4.99
Short-term unemployed 56.49 25.16 47.91 68.61 61.84 53.83 4.45
Medium-term unemployed 61.38 26.83 53.73 75.65 66.23 57.86 4.87
Long-term unemployed 63.49 24.76 50.15 75.97 58.50 57.24 4.68
No job experience 49.60 24.27 51.12 69.90 60.34 52.98 4.37
Men 60.51 24.34 49.92 74.93 66.67 55.77 4.77
Women 59.09 26.55 50.44 70.65 58.71 56.00 4.52
Young 54.02 28.57 56.75 70.98 68.62 56.49 4.79
Old 62.67 24.00 46.83 73.40 59.02 55.59 4.51
Natives
All 60.91 25.20 49.88 71.76 62.15 56.70 4.64
No job experience 52.11 24.33 51.30 67.93 61.12 55.53 4.44
Immigrants
All 48.02 29.04 53.46 80.62 63.68 47.85 4.56
No job experience 28.57 23.81 49.59 86.37 53.86 31.53 3.79
Years of residence
3 and less than 3 years 41.07 25.95 52.37 80.96 61.83 45.03 4.32
More than 3 years 51.54 30.61 54.02 80.46 64.61 49.29 4.68
Regions
Non EU-15 45.14 25.81 52.55 80.61 62.67 46.30 4.47
Latin America 48.59 30.43 56.30 80.12 63.88 50.06 4.66
Africa 49.52 29.97 48.81 81.99 64.50 44.95 4.44
Asia 51.72 27.09 51.23 78.33 62.56 47.78 4.64
Note: Short-term unemployed refers to those unemployed for less than three months; Medium-term unem-
ployed to those unemployed for between three and twelve months; Long-term unemployed to those unemployed
for one year or more.
Source: Own elaboration using Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
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might be explained by the increase in the percentage of unemployed immigrants receiving
unemployment benefit (UB). In other words, while in 2005 many unemployed immigrants
had been working in informal sectors or had been in Spain for a very short time (i.e., they
were ineligible for UB), in 2010 immigrants that had been working in formal sectors, and
who were therefore eligible for UB, became unemployed.
Table 2: Use of different job search methods by unemployed workers
Percentage of unemployed workers Average
public private news personal direct other Number
agency agency networks Methods
Natives
2005 61.48 27.71 45.83 69.50 59.73 64.30 4.61
2006 57.07 24.95 46.30 67.09 57.16 57.99 4.37
2007 56.78 22.00 42.47 62.72 54.87 53.60 4.17
2008 59.12 23.87 47.92 70.09 60.97 54.29 4.74
2009 65.54 25.99 57.10 78.93 68.47 55.46 5.06
2010 62.95 25.92 58.99 80.97 70.71 52.43 4.50
Immigrants
2005 39.91 30.28 48.45 77.80 58.54 49.69 4.20
2006 38.18 26.93 47.41 73.83 54.36 42.60 3.93
2007 37.65 25.39 44.71 72.55 55.20 44.02 3.91
2008 46.61 29.99 51.96 80.38 64.47 46.15 4.71
2009 56.64 29.98 60.25 86.52 71.11 51.90 5.10
2010 59.16 30.73 60.92 85.85 67.79 49.60 4.63
Source: Own elaboration using Spanish Labor Force Survey (INE).
4 Empirical methodology
We begin by analyzing the factors that lead an unemployed individual to use a specific job
search method. As described in section 2, we aggregated the job search methods in six
groups.13 Then, our dependent variable is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if the
individual reports using the job search method and 0 otherwise.
13In the estimations we consider the following five groups of job search methods: public employment agency,
private employment agency, personal networks, news and direct search methods.
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smi,j = 1 if individual i reports using job search method j, smi,j = 0 if individual i does
not report using job search method j.
Then, we estimate the following logit model:




where i indexes individuals and j the different job search methods and Xi is a set of
control variables. Specifically, we estimate the determinants of each one of the five job search
methods using two econometric specifications. First, we estimate the determinants of each
job search method group including a dummy for the individual’s nationality and a set of
control variables that include age, age squared, years of residence, previous sector in which
individual was employed (where applicable) and unemployment duration and dummy vari-
ables for gender, marital status, level of education, UB and previous experience. We have
also included the unemployment rate at a regional level for each quarter in our period.14,15
All these personal characteristics are included to remove the composition of the groups (na-
tives and immigrants) and other potentially confounding factors from our estimations. For
instance: i) if the group of workers with an education level less than high school is becoming
more native with the onset of the crisis, controlling by education level could remove the part
of the effect due purely to the composition of the groups; ii) if sectors in which immigrants find
employment are more sensitive to business cycle fluctuations than other sectors, controlling
by the previous sector of employment could control for this potential source of heterogeneity.
Regional unemployment is included in order to remove the variation that is purely driven by
the cross-regional differences. Second, we use the same set of control variables but disaggre-
gate the nationality dummy into four separate dummies to identify immigrants from other
European (non EU-15) countries, Asia, Africa and Latin America.16 In both specifications
we include dummy variables for the year in which the survey was conducted to capture time-
varying effects such as the business cycle.17 Because of the Spanish labor market crisis, we
14For each unemployed worker these personal characteristics correspond to the first unemployment spell
that we observe.
15UB was excluded from the estimation of the public employment agency determinants. To receive the UB
a person has to be registered at a public employment office so, in order to avoid endogeneity, we decided to
exclude these variables.
16Disaggregation of nationalities provided by the SLFS.
17For instance, skill composition changes over the business cycle, with relatively high skilled people becom-
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are also concerned about immigrants returning to their countries of origin. If this process is
qualitatively relevant, it could affect our sample and, ultimately, bias our estimates. In rela-
tion to this possible source of selection bias, we check the magnitude of this return migration
using three different statistics, and we do not find any evidence that it constitutes a major
issue in our period of analysis (until, that is, the second semester of 2010).18,19
As previously mentioned, in our data we can only observe exits from unemployment on a
quarterly basis. This type of data fits discrete-time survival models well. In this second step,
following Wooldridge (2001), Bover et al. (2002) and Jenkins (2005), and using our sample
from the SLFS, we build an unbalanced rotating panel data-set to estimate a discrete time
duration model. The data allow us to construct a panel of individuals which are observed
over a maximum of C discrete time periods after becoming unemployed (2 ≤ C ≤ 6). We
observe T if T < C, otherwise we only observe the event that T ≥ C. In our panel, we
consider that T is independent of C (is a rotating panel). We also assume proportional
transition rates for individual i, causing proportional shifts of a so-called baseline transition
rate for the transition from unemployment to employment. Concretely, we model the discrete
transition probabilities using a complementary log-log specification that allows us to model
the hazard of unemployees’ exit rates. Then, we estimate the probability of transition from
unemployment to employment before the individuals leave the SLFS as:
λi(t) = Prob[T = t | T ≥ t,X1i ], (2)
where λi(t) represents the hazard rate at t and X
1
i is a vector of individual, sectoral and
ing unemployed at the beginning of the crisis.
18The Municipal Register shows that overall the number of immigrants in the working age population
increased across our period of analysis, and it fell, for the first time, in 2012. We also examined the statistics
of those excluded from the register because they did not re-register. In 2006 the government initiated a
re-registration control, forcing those immigrants from countries outside the EU-27 to re-register in their
municipality every two years. Between 2007 and 2010 the number of individuals that were excluded from the
Register increased by 20 thousand (from 140,000 to 160,000) and in the following two years it fell again so
that by 2012 there were 130,000 exclusions. Finally, at the end of 2008, the Spanish government implemented
a voluntary return migration program addressed to unemployed immigrant workers. The program has not
been very successful; in fact, during the period 2009-2012, only 10,299 individuals joined the program.
19For a detailed analysis of the migration outflows observed in recent years in Spain see Izquierdo et al.
(2015).
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aggregate characteristics. In addition to the set of control variables described above (Xi in
equation 1) X1i also includes a variable that indicates the log for the number of further waves
of data the respondent was expected to be present in. We also estimate other specifications
that contain multiplicative variables interacting the search methods with an individual’s
nationality.
Positive coefficient estimates suggest that larger values of the explanatory variables in-
crease the hazard of leaving unemployment. A negative coefficient estimate suggests that the
variable is negatively associated with the hazard.
Finally, to capture the business cycle behavior, and in particular the effects of the in-
ternational crisis, we examine how these hazards of leaving unemployment evolve over time,
depending on the nationality of the unemployed individuals, and the job search method used.
5 Econometric Results
5.1 Determinants of the search methods
Table 3 shows the results for the specification that analyzes the determinants of each of the
five job search methods, focusing on any distinctions between natives and immigrants.
We find a number of differences in their respective preferred job search methods. Specif-
ically, accounting for individual characteristics, we find that unemployed Spanish nationals
are more likely to use public and private employment offices, direct methods and news than
are their immigrant counterparts. However, native unemployed workers tend to use personal
networks less than immigrants. When we examine immigrant heterogeneity in terms of re-
gion of origin (bottom panel of Table 3) we find that unemployed foreign workers, from all
regions, are less likely to use public employment offices and direct methods and more likely
to use personal networks. Finally, we do not find any statistical differences between natives
and Latin American immigrants in terms of the use of news or between natives and African
immigrants in terms of the use of private employment agencies.
The above results might be interpreted as follows: i) given that immigrants are more
likely to be employed in sectors with high levels of informality (i.e., domestic service and
restaurants) employment offices (public and private) are less useful methods for finding a
work in those sectors; ii) in addition, the compulsory requirement to be registered at a
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Table 3: Estimates of logistic determinants of the job search methods (marginal
effects)
Determinants of the job search method (single dummy)
public private personal news direct
agency agency networks
Immigrant -0.277*** -0.052*** 0.129*** -0.048** -0.166***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Age 0.013*** 0.000 0.006*** 0.002 -0.003*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Age squared -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment benefit 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Secondary education -0.001 0.038*** -0.015*** 0.100*** 0.039***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
University education -0.031*** 0.079*** -0.065*** 0.201*** 0.081***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Men 0.036*** -0.024*** 0.029*** -0.007* 0.059***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Married 0.011*** -0.025*** -0.033*** -0.060*** -0.044***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of residence 0.008*** 0.003*** -0.002* -0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Unemployment duration -0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Regional unemployment -0.000 -0.011*** 0.004*** -0.012*** 0.007***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Elegibility for UB 0.010** -0.042*** -0.025*** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Europe non EU15 -0.289*** -0.080*** 0.131*** -0.067*** -0.173***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Asia -0.260*** -0.071** 0.091** -0.090** -0.200***
(0.037) (0.036) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Africa -0.284*** -0.032 0.148*** -0.075*** -0.163***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)
Latin America -0.269*** -0.039* 0.124*** -0.027 -0.161***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Observations 73,801 73,801 73,801 73,801 73,801
Notes: These specifications include year dummies and sector of previous employment. Significant at the 0.10
(*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). Reference categories: natives, Year 2005, female, primary education,
single and unemployed not receiving unemployment benefit. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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public employment office in order to receive UB may also explain that immigrants use this
job search method much less; iii) finally, the marked differences in the frequency of use of
personal networks between all groups of immigrants and natives provide evidence of the
importance within immigrant communities of helping fellow countrymen to integrate in the
country of destination.
The estimated parameters for the control variables present the expected signs. Unem-
ployed individuals receiving UB, and forming part of the SLFS sample, report making greater
use of all the job search methods than those that do not receive any benefit. This result might
reflect the monitoring of the job search activities of the unemployed that benefit from the
unemployment insurance system. We also find that job seekers with a university degree,
or those who have at least completed their secondary education, make more use of private
employment offices, news and direct methods, and less use of personal networks and public
employment office than unemployed workers that have only completed primary education.
These results are in line with previous studies that have shown that personal networks are es-
pecially relevant for poorly educated job seekers (i.e. Corcoran et al. (1980) and Boheim and
Taylor (2002)) and that news and direct methods are more common among highly educated
individuals (i.e. Boheim and Taylor (2002)) . As the period of unemployment increases,
individuals are more likely to use family networks and news and to rely less on the public
employment office. This result is consistent with the notion of the low efficiency of the public
employment agency for helping individuals find work, in the sense that the unemployed use
the public agency while they are receiving UB (given that it is a compulsory requirement)
but once the benefit is exhausted individuals desist from using the public agency as a search
method. Men are more likely than women to use personal networks and direct methods and
less likely to use public and private employment offices and news. Unemployed individuals
that are married make less use of all the methods than those that are single with the exception
of the public employment office.
We find some evidence in favor of assimilation; specifically, immigrants tend to use public
and private agencies more and personal networks less as the period of time they have spent in
Spain increases. Finally, unemployed individuals who reside in regions with high unemploy-
ment tend to use personal networks and direct methods more, while the other three methods
are more common among individuals resident in regions with low levels of unemployment.
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Most of these results are consistent with outcomes reported in Frijters et al. (2005) and Battu
et al. (2011); in particular, the finding that the use of personal networks is the most important
search mechanism among immigrant communities and the poorly educated unemployed.
5.2 Employment
This section examines the correlates of the job search methods on the hazard of leaving
unemployment controlling by individual characteristics and, in section 5.2.3, we also control
for unobserved heterogeneity. We focus the analysis on the relationship between the job search
methods, the job seeker’s country of origin and the hazard of leaving unemployment. More
specifically, we estimate how the probability of finding any type of job and the probability of
finding a permanent job differ between natives and immigrants.
5.2.1 Total employment
Table 4 presents the results for finding any type of job before leaving the SLFS. We show
three different specifications including a dummy (or dummies) for immigrant status. The
main difference between these specifications is that in the second (model two) we add inter-
actions between the immigrant dummy and the different job search methods and in the third
model (column three) we disaggregate the immigrant dummy into four separate dummies for
immigrants from European non EU-15 countries, Asia, Africa and Latin America, keeping
the interactions between job search methods and regions of origin. The complete results with
the estimated control parameters are deferred to the Annex (see Table A.1).
Our results indicate that unemployed immigrants are less likely to exit from unemploy-
ment than are job seekers with Spanish nationality (models one and two) and that this
disadvantage is clear for all groups of immigrants (model three). This general result is also in
line with previous findings for the UK (see Frijters et al. (2005) and Battu et al. (2011)) that
show a clear penalty for non-whites with respect to whites in finding jobs. An interpretation
for this result is the following: during the period of economic growth (the early years in our
study period - 2005 to 2007) the number of jobs increased by almost two million and fifty
percent of these positions were occupied by immigrants, mostly on a fixed-term basis and
concentrated primarily in the construction sector and domestic services.20 Later, the con-
20Gonza´lez and Ortega (2011) show that the large inflows of immigrants covered most of the low-skill
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struction sector was the sector most severely affected by the economic crisis and, therefore,
immigrant workers, clearly over-represented in this sector, have been seriously affected by the
crisis. Thus, the disadvantage faced by immigrant communities in finding jobs is reflected in
the worsening labor market performance of immigrants compared to those of native workers
throughout our period of study.
We observe that unemployed workers who, at the very least, report being registered at
a public employment office, using personal networks and news as search methods, are less
likely to find jobs. However, those who report the use of, at least, private agencies and direct
approaches seems to no influence the job finding. When we interact the job search methods
with the immigrant dummy, we find that news (which on its own has a negative effect) has
a strong positive effect on the hazard of leaving unemployment, completely offsetting the
original negative effect. In other words, unemployed immigrants who report using news as
a search method are more successful in finding jobs than those who do not report the use
of this method. In the case of personal networks, although not statistically significant, we
find that those immigrants who report using this method would have lower unemployment
exit rates than those who report not using it (magnifying the original effect). These results
are consistent with Battu et al. (2011) who report that there is a penalty in exit from
unemployment when individuals use personal networks as a job search method.
The estimated parameters of the control variables (presented in Table A.1) are, in general,
statistically significant and present the expected signs. For instance, time in unemployment
reduces the hazard of leaving unemployment and unemployed individuals with secondary
and university education find jobs more easily than those who have only completed primary
education. Previous experience in the Finance, Industry, Construction and Commerce sectors
makes the transition from unemployment to employment more difficult, while the contrary is
the case for those unemployed with experience in the agricultural sector. We also find that
the hazard of leaving unemployment is higher for men than it is for women and for married
than it is for single individuals. The number of years’ residence in Spain does not seem to
have any relation with on the probability of finding work.
When we allow for immigrant heterogeneity in terms of region of origin (model three
Table 4), we estimate that the disadvantage is important for immigrants from all regions.
vacancies in these sectors.
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Table 4: Estimates of hazards of leaving unemployment
Model one Model two Model three








Public agency -0.206*** Public agency -0.208*** Public agency -0.207***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Private agency -0.009 Private agency -0.014 Private agency -0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Per. Networks -0.259*** Per. Networks -0.254*** Per. Networks -0.254***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
News -0.142*** News -0.157*** News -0.157***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)












Observations 196,131 196,131 196,131
Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 3. In addition, these specifications include an indicator for the remaining number of
waves of data the respondent was expected to be present in. The higher number of observations compared
to Table 3 is due to the fact that we construct a panel from the previous sample of unemployed using the
expected duration in the SLFS.
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Examining the interactions (Table A.1), we find a positive effect for those immigrants from
Latin America, Europe non EU-15 and Africa who report using news as a job search method.
So, the positive influences of the interactions between immigrant status and news that we
found in the model two seem to be a generalized effect, offsetting the original negative effect.
For the rest of the interactions between nationalities and search methods there is no clear
patterns.
As mentioned in section 1, one of the objectives of this paper is to analyze the effects
of the economic crisis on the search strategies and labor market performance of natives
and immigrants in Spain. From a broader perspective, we wish to provide evidence of the
relationship between the hazards of unemployment and the business cycle. We seek a response
to the following questions: i) How does the employment crisis influence native and immigrant
probabilities of finding a job? and ii) How has the effectiveness of the different job search
methods changed since the onset of the economic crisis? To address these questions, first,
Figure 2 shows the evolution in the predicted hazards of leaving unemployment for natives
and immigrants and, second, Figure 3 presents the evolution in the predicted hazards of
leaving unemployment depending on the job search method adopted.21








2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Natives
Immigrants
Note: These are the predictions from the model one in Table 4 including dummies for year-quarter interaction.
The rest of variables were hold at their mean.
In general we observe a marked decline in the job finding probabilities of both, natives
21In Figures 2 and 3 we plot the predicted hazards, holding the rest of the variables at their sample mean.
So, the differences that we observe, in both graphs, can be attributed to the immigrant dummy.
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and immigrants, with the onset of the international crisis in mid-2007 (see Figure 2). In
addition, higher probabilities are observed for natives since the beginning of 2006 and this
gap broadens with the onset of the international economic downturn. As such, this result
provides empirical support for claims that the international crisis, initiated in the middle of
2007, has affected immigrants more severely than it has natives.
Figure 3 shows that the effectiveness of all search methods has fallen since 2007; in partic-
ular, the disadvantage of using personal networks to find a work widened since the beginning
of the international crisis. This is consistent with the previous findings that highlight that
this method is much more frequent among those collectives which present the worst per-
formances in the labor market. For the other job search methods, the differences are not
statistically significant.
























































Note: These are the predictions from the model one in Table 4 including dummies for year-quarter interaction.
The rest of variables were hold at their mean.
5.2.2 Permanent employment
We are also interested in determining whether nationality and the choice of job search meth-
ods might influence the job quality (type of employment contract) that job seekers find. Given
the duality (permanent and fixed-term jobs) that characterizes the country’s labor market
21
22, we aim to shed some light on this issue by analyzing the interaction between job search
methods, nationality and the probability of transition from unemployment to permanent
employment.
The results of these estimations are presented in Table 5. When accounting for job search
methods and observable individual characteristics (models one and two) we estimate a disad-
vantage for immigrants in terms of their unemployment exit rates to a permanent job but not
statistically significant. The same result is observed when we allow for heterogeneity among
immigrants, we find that the disadvantage is not statistically significant for unemployed
workers originally from all regions.
The importance of job search methods in relation to the hazard of leaving unemployment
to take up a permanent job differs somewhat from the probability of finding any type of job.
We also find that immigrants (especially those from Latin American and African countries)
who report using news as a job search method are more likely to find permanent employment
and, by contrast, unemployed immigrants, in particular those from Latin America, who, at
the very least, report using a public employment office are less successful in finding permanent
jobs. We also find (although falling just with short of statistical significance) that immigrants
from Africa that at very least use personal networks are less likely to exit from unemployment
to permanent employment while the contrary is the case for those immigrants using private
agencies. Finally, the estimated parameters of all control variables are presented in Table A.2
in the Annex. We find statistically significant estimates that are similar to those discussed
in section 5.2.1 above.
5.2.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
In this section we re-estimate the duration models already estimated in previous sections
(5.2.1 and 5.2.2) but allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. Due to unobserved factors, such
as ability, motivation, effort, differences in family income, social pressure, etc., there might
be some individuals who are more or less likely to leave unemployment. Then, unobserved
heterogeneity is likely to bias our estimation of interest.
In order to control for unobserved heterogeneity, we have used a method that considers an
22According to the SLFS, in our period of analysis, the average share of temporary contracts, among wage
earners, is 30.1% .
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Table 5: Estimates of hazards of leaving unemployment to a permanent job
Model one Model two Model three








Public agency -0.345*** Public agency -0.316*** Public agency -0.315***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Private agency -0.121*** Private agency -0.141*** Private agency -0.141***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.041)
Per. Networks -0.473*** Per. Networks -0.471*** Per. Networks -0.472***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
News -0.114*** News -0.152*** News -0.152***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)












Observations 196,131 196,131 196,131
Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 3. In addition, these specifications include an indicator for the remaining number of
waves of data the respondent was expected to be present in. The higher number of observations compared
to Table 3 is due to the fact that we construct a panel from the previous sample of unemployed using the
expected duration in the SLFS.
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individual random effect u independent from the covariates X. According to Jenkins (2005)
this individual unobserved component can be integrated out from the survivor function once
a functional form for u is specified. Then, in our estimates, unobserved heterogeneity is
modeled as an unobservable random effect u that is normally distributed.23
Table 6 shows the estimated results of the same specifications as the first columns in Tables
4 and 5 but controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (the full results and the other specifica-
tions of Tables 4 and 5 are deferred to the Annex to Tables A.3 and A.4). The likelihood ratio
test suggests statistically significant unobserved heterogeneity in both specifications. As in
section 5.2.1, for the hazard rates from unemployment to any type of employment (column
one in Table 6), we estimate a statistically significant disadvantage for immigrants, although
larger than in the previous estimates. The baseline estimate for our parameter of interest was
-0.36 and, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, is -1.15. This sizable difference in the
magnitude of our parameter of interest indicates that, controlling for unobserved individual
characteristics (e.g. ability, motivation, social pressure, etc.) is relevant for our analysis.
The rest of estimated parameters show the same sign as in the baseline model (column one
in Tables 4). The estimated hazard rates from unemployment to a permanent employment
(column two in Table 6) goes in the same line as the baseline model (column one in Table
5). We estimate a not statistically significant disadvantage for immigrants in terms of their
unemployment exit rates to a permanent job. However, when we include interactions be-
tween nationality and job search method, we estimate a statistically significant disadvantage
for immigrants, in particular for those who declare to use the public employment agency
(column 2 in Table A.4). Finally, when we consider heterogeneity of immigrants, we find a
statistically significant disadvantage for unemployed workers originally from Asia and Africa.
6 Final Remarks
In this paper, we have empirically analyzed whether native and immigrant job search strate-
gies differ and how this choice of strategies correlates with their hazard rates of leaving
unemployment, using individual data from SLFS for the period 2005-2010. First, we have
23We use the xtcloglog command in STATA to estimate these models. The program reports the likelihood
ratio test for the null hypothesis that the variance of the individual effects is zero. Unobserved heterogeneity
is not important if this hypothesis cannot be rejected.
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Public agency -0.735*** -0.698***
(0.051) (0.083)
Private agency -0.019 -0.232***
(0.044) (0.078)










Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 3. In addition, these specifications include an indicator for the remaining number of
waves of data the respondent was expected to be present in. The higher number of observations compared
to Table 3 is due to the fact that we construct a panel from the previous sample of unemployed using the
expected duration in the SLFS.
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focused our analysis on the determinants of the job search methods adopted. Second, using
duration data constructed from a rotating panel sample, we have estimated discrete hazard
models in order to analyze the hazards of leaving unemployment and, in particular, to de-
termine how the search strategies interact with the job finding probabilities before and after
the economic crisis.
The main findings can be summarized as follows:
1. Immigrants tend to use personal networks more, and to use employment agencies (pub-
lic and private) and direct search methods less, than natives. Moreover, individual
characteristics (i.e. education, gender, civil status, unemployment duration) play an
important role in determining the use of the different job search methods.
2. After controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics unemployed immigrants
tend to exit from unemployment less easily than natives. The influence of the economic
crisis on the labor market has been a generalized feature; however, the importance have
not been uniform across collectives. We also find that the differences between native
and immigrant exit rates have grown since the onset of the economic crisis (from the
second half of 2007).
3. The use of personal networks, the public employment office, and news are methods that
negatively correlate with the hazards of leaving unemployment. The adoption, at the
very least, of direct methods increases the probability to find a job.
4. When we allow for interactions between nationality and job search methods, immigrants
present a number of specific outcomes. Thus, those immigrants that report using
news as a search method find themselves at an advantage when leaving unemployment.
Moreover, this result remains valid for immigrants from all regions. We find the opposite
result for those immigrants who, at the very least, report using personal networks as a
search method. Finally, direct methods seem to be particularly useful in helping Asian
immigrants find jobs.
5. When it comes to finding a permanent job, although with very low levels of statistical
significance, we find that immigrants are at a disadvantage when it comes to getting
permanent jobs. In the case of interactions between job search methods and the nation-
ality of the unemployed, we find that those immigrants who report using, at least, news
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or a private agency as search methods have an advantage in terms of the hazards of
leaving unemployment, while the opposite is the case for immigrants who report using
the public agency.
Our findings regarding the effectiveness of public employment offices are disquieting.
In particular, our results indicate a negative selection of unemployed workers (male, old
and low-skilled) by this public agency but, after controlling for individual characteristics,
leaving unemployment is much more difficult for those unemployed workers who declare
using public offices as a search method. From the perspective of policy makers, improving the
effectiveness of the public employment office, by promoting active labor market policies so as
to counterbalance the difficulties of finding employment and the hardships of the international
economic crisis, represents something of a challenge.
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Annex
Table A.1: Estimates of hazards of leaving unemployment
Model one Model two Model three








Public agency -0.206*** Public agency -0.208*** Public agency -0.207***
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015)
Private agency -0.009 Private agency -0.014 Private agency -0.014
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Per. Networks -0.259*** Per. Networks -0.254*** Per. Networks -0.254***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
News -0.142*** News -0.157*** News -0.157***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Direct 0.005 Direct 0.004 Direct 0.004
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Years res. -0.005 Years res. -0.006 Years res. -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Imm*Age 0.009** Imm*Age 0.009** Imm*Age 0.012**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Age -0.044*** Age -0.043*** Age -0.046***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Age sq. 0.000*** Age sq. 0.000*** Age sq. 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secondary 0.092*** Secondary 0.092*** Secondary 0.090***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
University 0.262*** University 0.263*** University 0.262***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Male 0.100*** Male 0.100*** Male 0.102***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Married 0.069*** Married 0.068*** Married 0.069***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Reg. Unemp. -0.014*** Reg. Unemp. -0.014*** Reg. Unemp. -0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Un. Benef. 0.124*** Un. Benef. 0.124*** Un. Benef. 0.123***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
No Experience -0.489*** No Experience -0.488*** No Experience -0.488***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Time unemp. -0.048*** Time unemp. -0.048*** Time unemp. -0.048***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Construction -0.157*** Construction -0.156*** Construction -0.156***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Industry -0.197*** Industry -0.199*** Industry -0.197***
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Agricultural 0.110*** Agricultural 0.122*** Agricultural 0.132***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
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Table A.1 – Continued
Finance -0.257*** Finance -0.261*** Finance -0.266***
(0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Com.&Serv. -0.106*** Com.&Serv. -0.111*** Com.&Serv. -0.111***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
log(duration) 0.924*** log(duration) 0.924*** log(duration) 0.926***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Pub.ag.*imm. -0.005 Pub.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 0.082
(0.042) (0.083)
Pr.ag.*imm. 0.049 Pr.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 0.014
(0.047) (0.095)
P.net.*imm. -0.044 P.net.*Eu-n-EU15 -0.010
(0.049) (0.096)
News.*imm. 0.156*** News.*Eu-n-EU15 0.146*
(0.043) (0.081)
































Observations 196,131 196,131 196,131
Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 4. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Estimates of hazards of leaving unemployment to a permanent job
Model one Model two Model three








Public agency -0.345*** Public agency -0.316*** Public agency -0.315***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.042)
Private agency -0.121*** Private agency -0.141*** Private agency -0.141***
(0.038) (0.041) (0.041)
Per. Networks -0.473*** Per. Networks -0.471*** Per. Networks -0.472***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
News -0.114*** News -0.152*** News -0.152***
(0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Direct -0.156*** Direct -0.152*** Direct -0.152***
(0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Years res. -0.007 Years res. -0.005 Years res. -0.000
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Imm.*Age 0.007 Imm.*Age 0.011 Imm.*Age 0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Age -0.123*** Age -0.125*** Age -0.129***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Age sq. 0.002*** Age sq. 0.002*** Age sq. 0.002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secondary 0.157*** Secondary 0.158*** Secondary 0.154***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
University 0.249*** University 0.254*** University 0.252***
(0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
Male -0.106*** Male -0.107*** Male -0.104***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Married 0.240*** Married 0.239*** Married 0.240***
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Reg. Unemp. -0.076*** Reg. Unemp. -0.077*** Reg. Unemp. -0.077***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Un. Benef. 0.323*** Un. Benef. 0.317*** Un. Benef. 0.315***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040)
No experience -0.531*** No experience -0.531*** No experience -0.529***
(0.065) (0.065) (0.065)
Time unemp. -0.039*** Time unemp. -0.038*** Time unemp. -0.039***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Construction -0.611*** Construction -0.589*** Construction -0.590***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Industry -0.475*** Industry -0.462*** Industry -0.464***
(0.106) (0.106) (0.106)
Agricultural -0.709*** Agricultural -0.680*** Agricultural -0.677***
(0.155) (0.156) (0.156)
Finance -0.303** Finance -0.305** Finance -0.312***
(0.120) (0.120) (0.121)
Com.&Serv. -0.074 Com.&Serv. -0.071 Com.&Serv. -0.071
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(0.066) (0.067) (0.067)
log(duration) 0.007 log(duration) 0.011 log(duration) 0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Pub.ag.*imm. -0.312*** Pub.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 -0.254
(0.110) (0.219)
Pr.ag.*imm. 0.209* Pr.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 0.352
(0.120) (0.246)
P.net.*imm. -0.001 P.net.*Eu-n-EU15 0.282
(0.120) (0.230)
News.*imm. 0.343*** News.*Eu-n-EU15 0.115
(0.111) (0.206)
































Observations 196,131 196,131 196,131
Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 5. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.3: Estimates of hazards of leaving unemployment with unobserved het-
erogeneity
Model one Model two Model three








Public agency -0.735*** Public agency -0.929*** Public agency -0.932***
(0.051) (0.071) (0.072)
Private agency -0.019 Private agency -0.052 Private agency -0.052
(0.044) (0.067) (0.067)
Per. Networks -0.992*** Per. Networks -1.260*** Per. Networks -1.265***
(0.054) (0.073) (0.073)
News -0.555*** News -0.790*** News -0.790***
(0.045) (0.065) (0.065)
Direct 0.071 Direct 0.095 Direct 0.095
(0.044) (0.066) (0.066)
Years res. -0.016 Years res. -0.022 Years res. -0.009
(0.013) (0.018) (0.019)
Imm*Age 0.030** Imm*Age 0.038* Imm*Age 0.050**
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Age -0.135*** Age -0.151*** Age -0.164***
(0.014) (0.020) (0.021)
Age sq. 0.001*** Age sq. 0.001*** Age sq. 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secondary 0.312*** Secondary 0.394*** Secondary 0.386***
(0.051) (0.072) (0.073)
University 0.826*** University 1.047*** University 1.046***
(0.065) (0.089) (0.090)
Male 0.326*** Male 0.420*** Male 0.430***
(0.039) (0.055) (0.055)
Married 0.194*** Married 0.228*** Married 0.232***
(0.043) (0.062) (0.062)
Reg. Unemp. -0.060*** Reg. Unemp. -0.087*** Reg. Unemp. -0.087***
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Un. Benef. 0.307*** Un. Benef. 0.375*** Un. Benef. 0.376***
(0.047) (0.066) (0.067)
No experience -1.578*** No experience -1.987*** No experience -1.992***
(0.082) (0.107) (0.108)
Time unemp. -0.160*** Time unemp. -0.209*** Time unemp. -0.210***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Construction -0.474*** Construction -0.545*** Construction -0.545***
(0.099) (0.139) (0.140)
Industry -0.554*** Industry -0.675*** Industry -0.668***
(0.127) (0.178) (0.179)
Agricultural 0.397*** Agricultural 0.631*** Agricultural 0.682***
(0.151) (0.202) (0.202)
Finance -0.707*** Finance -0.882*** Finance -0.889***
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(0.151) (0.214) (0.215)
Com.&Serv. -0.298*** Com.&Serv. -0.334*** Com.&Serv. -0.334***
(0.089) (0.126) (0.126)
log(duration) 5.989*** log(duration) 7.791*** log(duration) 7.824***
(0.160) (0.138) (0.136)
Pub.ag.*imm. -0.125 Pub.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 0.158
(0.194) (0.371)
Pr.ag.*imm. 0.251 Pr.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 0.043
(0.212) (0.426)
P.net.*imm. -0.039 P.net.*Eu-n-EU15 -0.083
(0.245) (0.481)
News.*imm. 0.629*** News*Eu-n-EU15 0.697*
(0.198) (0.381)
































χ2 4710 4768 4749
σu 4.380 5.657 5.677
ρ 0.921 0.951 0.951
Observations 196,131 196,131 196,131
Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 4. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table A.4: Estimates of hazards of leaving unemployment to a permanent job with
unobserved heterogeneity
Model one Model two Model three








Public agency -0.698*** Public agency -0.633*** Public agency -0.631***
(0.083) (0.085) (0.085)
Private agency -0.232*** Private agency -0.265*** Private agency -0.265***
(0.078) (0.082) (0.082)
Per. Networks -1.044*** Per. Networks -1.038*** Per. Networks -1.037***
(0.081) (0.084) (0.084)
News -0.209*** News -0.282*** News -0.282***
(0.074) (0.078) (0.078)
Direct -0.327*** Direct -0.311*** Direct -0.310***
(0.074) (0.078) (0.078)
Years res. -0.006 Years res. -0.002 Years res. 0.006
(0.021) (0.021) (0.022)
Imm*Age 0.027 Imm*Age 0.035 Imm*Age 0.043*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Age -0.315*** Age -0.316*** Age -0.324***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Age sq. 0.004*** Age sq. 0.004*** Age sq. 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Secondary 0.281*** Secondary 0.280*** Secondary 0.273***
(0.089) (0.088) (0.088)
University 0.458*** University 0.464*** University 0.460***
(0.106) (0.105) (0.105)
Male -0.282*** Male -0.281*** Male -0.275***
(0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Married 0.515*** Married 0.508*** Married 0.511***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Reg. Unemp. -0.148*** Reg. Unemp. -0.147*** Reg. Unemp. -0.147***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Un. Benef. 0.623*** Un. Benef. 0.605*** Un. Benef. 0.603***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.082)
No experience -1.120*** No experience -1.118*** No experience -1.114***
(0.132) (0.131) (0.131)
Time unemp. -0.079*** Time unemp. -0.078*** Time unemp. -0.078***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Construction -1.224*** Construction -1.172*** Construction -1.179***
(0.184) (0.183) (0.183)
Industry -0.953*** Industry -0.927*** Industry -0.924***
(0.220) (0.218) (0.218)
Agricultural -1.516*** Agricultural -1.441*** Agricultural -1.435***
(0.297) (0.295) (0.296)
Finance -0.700*** Finance -0.700*** Finance -0.711***
(0.254) (0.251) (0.251)
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Com.&Serv. -0.120 Com.&Serv. -0.110 Com.&Serv. -0.104
(0.140) (0.139) (0.139)
log(duration) 2.612*** log(duration) 2.593*** log(duration) 2.542***
(0.055) (0.054) (0.089)
Pub.ag.*imm. -0.638*** Pub.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 -0.466
(0.230) (0.441)
Pr.ag.*imm. 0.406 Pr.ag.*Eu-n-EU15 0.643
(0.251) (0.500)
P.net.*imm. 0.061 P.net.*Eu-n-EU15 0.558
(0.263) (0.500)
News.*imm. 0.718*** News.*Eu-n-EU15 0.133
(0.234) (0.431)
































χ2 137.9 136.3 134.8
σu 3.691 3.656 3.652
ρ 0.892 0.890 0.890
Observations 196,131 196,131 196,131
Notes: Significant at the 0.10 (*); 0.05 (**); and 0.01 levels (***). These specifications include all the control
variables used in Table 5. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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